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Non-Nuclear, Low-Carbon, or Both? The Case of Taiwan  
Y.-H. Henry Chen* 
Abstract 
The Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan has renewed debates on the safety of nuclear power, 
possibly hurting the role of nuclear power in efforts to limit CO2 emissions. I develop a dynamic 
economy-wide model of Taiwan with a detailed set of technology options in the power sector to 
examine the implications of adopting different nuclear power policies on CO2 emissions and the 
economy. Absent a carbon mitigation target, limiting nuclear power has a small economic cost for 
Taiwan, but CO2 emissions may increase by more than 3.5% by 2035 when nuclear is replaced by 
fossil-based generation. With a low-carbon target of a 50% reduction from year 2000 levels by 
2050, if the nuclear option and carbon sequestration are not viable, gas-fired power would 
provide almost 90% of electricity output due to the limited renewable resources. In particular, 
wind power would account for 1.6% to 4.9% of that output, depending on how it relies on other 
back-up capacities. With both non-nuclear and low-carbon policies, deploying carbon 
sequestration on fossil-based generation can significantly reduce the negative GDP impact on the 
economy. Lastly, lowering carbon mitigation costs further is possible with expanded nuclear 
capacity. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
     Concern about global warming seems to make nuclear power an attractive option. The 
Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan, however, has renewed the debate on the safety of nuclear 
power, possibly hurting the role of nuclear power in efforts to limit CO2 emissions. For instance, 
Japan has decided to increase its renewable energy supply and abandon the expansion of nuclear 
industry, and Germany will shut all nuclear reactors by 2022 (Fackler, 2011; Mcgroarty and 
Fuhrmans, 2011).  
                                                            
* Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 77 
Massachusetts Ave, E19-429N. Cambridge, MA 02139-4307. Email: chenyh@mit.edu. Tel: 1-(617)-715-5432.  
2 
 
     In Taiwan, the ongoing nuclear power project is intensely debated as well. Because of safety 
concerns and challenges in finding repository sites for nuclear waste, many people are urging the 
government to stop building the Longmen Nuclear Power Station. The concern persists, even 
after the government announced that Longmen will be Taiwan’s fourth and last nuclear power 
project. On the other hand, others argue that the nuclear option should be kept since it is a viable 
approach to curb CO2 emissions effectively without reducing electricity supply. This is 
especially important for Taiwan since, because of resource constraints, the role of renewable 
power sources may remain insignificant. 
     While more and more countries try to cut CO2 emissions to reduce the threat of global 
warming, we still have limited understanding about the potential effects of pursuing low-carbon 
growth with or without the nuclear option. Thus, an economy-wide analysis that studies the role 
of nuclear power in pursuing a low-carbon economy is crucial, especially for a small economy 
such as Taiwan, which lacks natural resources and must import most of its energy supply. 
     Until now, existing studies have found that nuclear power is an effective tool to curb CO2 
emissions from the power sector, especially in the long run (Wang et al., 2011; Yang, 2011; 
Bensmann, 2010; Yun and Baker, 2009; Mori, 2000). They do not, however, analyze cases 
where nuclear power is no longer an option. One exception is Mori (2000), which found that 
limiting CO2 emissions without nuclear power expansion requires a higher level of carbon 
sequestration implementation and would incur a greater negative impact on global GDP. 
Nevertheless, higher resolutions on regions and sectors are not presented in the research.  A 
number of studies, on the other hand, examined energy and nuclear policies in Taiwan separately 
(Lin, 1997; Hsu et al., 1998; Huang, 2000; Liang and Kuo, 2003; Huang, 2007; Lin and Su, 
2008; Liang, 2008; Yang, 2009; and Ko et al., 2010). None of the research, however, has 
presented a framework that can simultaneously assess the potential effects of pursuing a non-
nuclear and low-carbon growth scenario. While other studies have explored CO2 reduction 
impacts on different sectors or technologies (Bureau, 2011; Chen et al., 2011; Karplus et al., 
2009; McFarland, 2009), the interaction between non-nuclear option and low-carbon policy is 
beyond their research scopes.      
     To fill this gap, this study takes Taiwan as an example and explores the policy implications of 
pursuing low-carbon growth with or without the nuclear option. With the low-carbon policy, 
Taiwan will eventually cut its CO2 emissions to 50% of 2000 levels by 2050. Under the non-
nuclear policy, while the existing three nuclear power plants of Taiwan will continue to operate 
until the end of their lives in 2020s, the coming nuclear power plant under construction will 
never be allowed to join the grid. In addition, under the low-carbon policy, a counterfactual 
scenario that allows further expansion of nuclear power beyond the government’s plan will also 
be discussed. 
     This study will answer the following questions: (1) what will be the economic implications of 
carrying out the low-carbon policy with or without the nuclear option; and (2) what will be the 
roles of various generation technologies under different policy scenarios? To conduct the 
analysis, a multi-sector recursive dynamic general equilibrium model is built. The model takes 
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into account the optimized behaviors of distinct producers and a representative household, and 
their interactions through various market transactions. This study also disaggregates the 
electricity sector into six sub-sectors to account for the diversified carbon footprints of various 
generation technologies, and to represent the cost of CO2 reduction, it considers a hypothetical 
carbon tax that covers all combustion CO2 emissions, which constitute about 96% and 88% of 
Taiwan’s total CO2 emissions and GHG emissions as of 2008, respectively (EPA, 2009).1 
Further, this study presents a new approach that improves the modeling for the relationship 
between dispatchable generation (gas and hydro power for instance) and non-dispatchable 
generation (wind power in particular).  
    The rest of this study is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the energy and policy 
background of Taiwan; Section 3 describes model settings and the strategy of modeling 
dispatchable and non-dispatchable electricity generation; Section 4 presents the economic, 
demographic, technological, and emissions data used in this study; Section 5 explores the 
economy-wide effects of various policies; and Section 6 provides conclusions, which summarize 
contributions of this study and discuss future research directions. 
2. ENERGY AND POLICY BACKGROUND OF TAIWAN 
     Taiwan currently imports 99% of its energy supply (Bureau of Energy, 2011a). In addition to 
encouraging energy saving measures, the government has tried to promote the use of different 
energy types and to diversify energy imports sources. For the electricity sector, as of 2008, coal-
fired, gas-fired, oil-fired, nuclear, and hydro-powered generation accounted for roughly 52.5%, 
19.4%, 6.0%, 17.1%, and 3.3% of the total electricity supply, respectively, as shown in Table 1. 
At this time, the government was expanding the country’s nuclear power capacity by building 
the Longmen Nuclear Power Station, now in the last construction phase (Bureau of Energy, 
2011b; The Nuclear Association of Taiwan, 2011). With a capacity of 2750 MWe, the plant 
would need only 80 tons of uranium feedstock in a year to generate the same amount of 
electricity as 515 million tons of coal or 143 million tons of natural gas (The New Taipei City 
Government, 2011).2  
     The government has set a target of reducing total CO2 emissions to the 2005 and 2000 levels 
by 2020, and 2025, respectively, and finally cutting emissions to the half of 2000 levels by 2050 
(Environmental Protection Administration, 2012). Nuclear power proponents assert that nuclear 
power is a feasible way to curb CO2 emissions in Taiwan, which have more than doubled in the 
last two decades and have made Taiwan become one of the highest per capita CO2 emissions 
countries in Asia, as shown in Table 2. They argue that without the nuclear option, achieving the 
emissions reduction target would be next to impossible.  
                                                            
1 The hypothetical carbon tax requires individuals to internalize the cost of emissions imposed on others and on 
future generation (Metcalf and Weisbach, 2009). In particular, the larger tax base ensures a less distortionary 
impact on resource allocation and thus avoids overestimating the economic burden of cutting emissions. 
2 As a result, even at the highest historical uranium price level at $136 per pound in 2007 (Scott, 2011), the fuel cost 
of a nuclear power plant still constitutes a minor part of its production cost compared to fossil-based power 
plants.  
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Table 1. Electricity generation mix for selected countries in 2008. 
World Taiwan US Japan Germany France China Brazil 
Coal 40.8% 52.5% 48.8% 26.6% 45.6% 4.7% 79.1% 2.7% 
Gas 21.2% 19.4% 20.8% 26.2% 13.8% 3.8% 0.9% 6.3% 
Oil 5.5% 6.0% 1.3% 12.9% 1.5% 1.0% 0.7% 3.8% 
Nuclear 13.5% 17.1% 19.2% 23.9% 23.3% 76.4% 2.0% 3.0% 
Hydro 16.2% 3.3% 6.5% 7.7% 4.2% 11.9% 16.9% 79.8% 
Other 2.8% 1.7% 3.4% 2.8% 11.6% 2.1% 0.5% 4.5% 
Source: IEA (2011). 
      
Table 2. CO2 emissions from energy consumption in 2006 for selected countries. 
Country 
Per capita emissions  
(ton-CO2/person) 
Total emissions  
(million ton-CO2) 
China 4.58 6017.69 
India 1.16 1293.17 
Japan 9.78 1246.76 
Malaysia 6.70 163.53 
Philippine 0.81 72.39 
South Korea 10.53 514.53 
Taiwan 11.40 259.27 
Thailand 3.79 245.04 
Germany 10.40 857.60 
France 6.60 417.75 
United Kingdom 9.66 585.71 
United States 19.78 5902.75 
World 4.48 29195.42 
Source: EIA (2009a; 2009b) and Bureau of Energy (2010).  
 
     Opponents of nuclear power, on the other hand, emphasize that for Taiwan, the current risk of 
a devastating earthquake such as the one that occurred in Japan poses serious safety concerns for 
the existing and forthcoming nuclear power plants. In case of nuclear accident, it would be very 
difficult for the over five million residents living within 30 kilometers of the nuclear power 
stations to move to a safer place in such a populated island, as shown in Figure 1. Nuclear 
opponents argue that the development of less energy-intensive industry, the improvement of 
efficiency, more utilization of renewable resources, and the advancement of carbon mitigation 
technology such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) should be the future development path. 
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Figure 1. Nuclear power plants in Taiwan (Source: Taipower (2012); Google Map). 
 
     After the Fukushima accident, the Longmen Nuclear Power Station, which was expected to 
join the grid by the end of 2011, is under scrutiny by experts due to various safety concerns, and 
its operation has been postponed. However, President Ying-Jeou Ma and his Nationalist Party 
(KMT) have reaffirmed that the power plant should be operated later. On the other hand, the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the main opposition party of Taiwan, has proposed the 
“non-nuclear homeland policy,” which asserts that the Longmen Nuclear Power Station should 
not be operated even after the construction is done, and Taiwan should go non-nuclear after 2025 
when all three existing nuclear power plants reach the end of their lives.  
     In this study, to represent the government's plan, in the business-as-usual (BAU), the 
Longmen Nuclear Power Station will be allowed to operate from 2015 onward, but there will be 
no additional nuclear power projects up to 2050. The implication of DPP's non-nuclear homeland 
Taipei
No. 1 Nuclear Power Station 
No. 3 Nuclear Power station
Longmen Nuclear Power Station 
(Under construction) 
Circle with a 30 km radius 
TAIWAN
No. 2 Nuclear Power Station 
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policy with or without the carbon mitigation target also will be considered. Finally, the potential 
role of CCS and nuclear power in cutting the cost of carbon reduction will be discussed. 
 
3. THE MODEL    
     The multi-sector recursive dynamic general equilibrium model built for this study belongs to 
the class of Arrow-Debreu model, which assumes markets are perfectly competitive, and the 
utility function is strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable to ensure the existence 
and uniqueness of the solution (Arrow and Debreu, 1954). The model is formulated in a series of 
mixed complementary problems (MCP) (Mathiesen, 1985) using the MPSGE modeling language 
(Rutherford, 1999). The base year is 2006, and from 2010 onward, it is solved at five-year 
intervals up to 2050. 
3.1 Basic Structure 
     Three key components in the model are household, producers, and government, as shown in 
Figure 2. The household owns labor and capital, provides them to producers and receives net 
factor payments from producers. In addition, the household also receives net transfers from 
government or abroad as part of disposable income, and then allocates the disposable income for 
consumption and savings to maximize utility, as presented below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Model structure. 
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     The utility function w in (1) is represented by a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
function with the structure shown in Figure 3a, ݄ is the household disposable income, ݌ܽ௜ is the 
price of Armington good ݅, which is the CES aggregation of domestic and imported goods, ܿ௜, 
݌݅݊ݒ, and ݏ are private consumption, price of investment, and private savings, respectively.  
݉ܽݔ௖೔,௦ ݓሺܿ௜, ݏሻ 		ݏ. ݐ.			݄ ൌ ∑ ݌ܽ௜ ∙ ܿ௜௜ ൅ ݌݅݊ݒ ∙ ݏ  (1) 
In addition, ݄ includes factor payment, net foreign transfer, and net government transfer as 
follows: 
݄ ൌ ∑ ݌ ௡݂ ∙ ௡݂௡ ൅ ݌݂ݔ ∙ ሺ݂ݐݎ݄ െ ݄ݐݎ݂ሻ ൅ ݌ݓ ∙ ሺ݃ݐݎ݄ െ ݀ݐሻ  (2) 
     In (2), ݌ ௡݂ is the rental price for primary factor ݊ (݊ ∈ ሼlabor, capitalሽ), ௡݂ is the factor 
supply, and ݃ݐݎ݄, ݂ݐݎ݄, ݄ݐݎ݂, ݀ݐ, ݌ݓ, and ݌݂ݔ are government transfer to household, foreign 
transfer to household, household transfer to abroad, direct tax, price index for welfare, and price 
index for foreign exchange, respectively. The first order condition for utility maximization can 
be formulated as the MCP problem presented in (3), and consumption and savings can be derived 
by Shephard’s Lemma as shown in (4): 
݁ሺ݌ܽ௜, ݌݅݊ݒሻ ൒ ݌ݓ	; ݓ ൒ 0	; ሾ݁ሺ݌ܽ௜, ݌݅݊ݒሻ െ ݌ݓ	ሿ ∙ ݓ ൌ 0  (3) 
ܿ௜ ൌ ݄ డ௘డ௣௔೔ 	 ; 	ݏ ൌ ݄
డ௘
డ௣௜௡௩  (4) 
     Producers (production sectors), on the other hand, transform primary factors (labor and 
capital) and intermediate inputs (outputs of other domestic or foreign producers) into goods and 
services, sell them to household, government, other domestic producers, or export them. 
According to Rutherford and Light (2001), there is also an Armington differentiation between 
goods produced for domestic and export markets, which is modeled by a constant elasticity of 
transformation (CET) function, as shown in Figure 3b. The producer’s problem is written as: 
݉ܽݔ௫೔,௘೔,௜ௗೕ,௙ௗ೙ ߨ௜ ൌ ݌ݔ௜ ∙ ݔ௜ ൅ ݌ݔ ௜݂ ∙ ݁௜ െ ߰௜൫݌ ௝ܽ, ݌ ௡݂, ݔ௜, ݁௜൯  (5) 
 
 
 
             
 
         
          
                
           
 
 
 
              
                  
                         
                                       
Figure 3. Utility and production functions. 
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     In problem (5), ߨ௜, ݌ݔ௜, ݔ௜, ݌ݔ ௜݂, ݁௜, ߰௜ሺ∙ሻ, and ݅ ௝݀ denote profit, price of domestic good, 
domestic good, domestic price of foreign (exported) good, export, cost function, and demand for 
intermediate inputs, respectively. The producer’s optimizing behavior requires the following 
zero-profit condition:  
డట೔
డ௫೔ ൒ ݌ݔ௜	; 	ݔ௜ ൒ 0	; ቂ
డట೔
డ௫೔ െ ݌ݔ௜ቃ ∙ ݔ௜ ൌ 0  (6) 
డట೔
డ௘೔ ൒ ݌ݔ ௜݂	; 	݁௜ ൒ 0	; ቂ
డట೔
డ௘೔ െ ݌ݔ ௜݂ቃ ∙ ݁௜ ൌ 0  (7) 
Conditions (6) and (7) determine the outputs of domestic good ݔ௜ and exported good ݁௜. Note 
that the domestic price of foreign good, ݌ݔ ௜݂, can be decomposed as: 
݌ݔ ௜݂ ൌ ݌݂ݔ ∙ ݌ݔ݂݁ݔ௜  (8) 
where ݌݂ݔ is the price of foreign exchange, and ݌ݔ݂݁ݔ௜ is the foreign price of foreign good i. 
This study follows the small open economy assumption, which means that Taiwan is the price 
taker of tradable goods, and because of that, ݌ݔ݂݁ݔ௜ is exogenous to the model. Similar to (4), 
the producer’s optimization behavior also determines the demand for intermediate goods (which 
are Armington goods) ݅ ௝݀ and the demand for factors ݂݀௡: 
݅ ௝݀ ൌ ݔ௜
൬ങഗ೔ങೣ೔൰
డ௣௔ೕ ൅	݁௜
൬ങഗ೔ങ೐೔ ൰
డ௣௔ೕ 	 ; 	݂݀௡ ൌ ݔ௜
൬ങഗ೔ങೣ೔൰
డ௣௙೙ ൅ ݁௜
൬ങഗ೔ങ೐೔ ൰
డ௣௙೙   (9) 
     The equilibrium level of imported good ݉௜ is determined in a way such that no further 
arbitrage opportunity exists, as shown in Condition (10):  
ܿ௠௜ ൌ ݌݂ݔ ∙ ݌ݔ݂݁ݔ௜ ∙ ሺ1 ൅ ݐܽݎ݂ݎ௜ሻ െ ݌ݔ ௜݂ ∙ ൫1 ൅ ݐܽݎ݂ݎതതതതതതതത௜൯ ൒ 0;	݉௜ ൒ 0; ܿ௠௜ ∙ ݉௜ ൌ 0  (10) 
where ݐܽݎ݂ݎ௜ is the tariff rate with an initial value ݐܽݎ݂ݎതതതതതതതത௜.  
     The equilibrium prices of different goods and factors are determined by a set of market 
clearing conditions. In particular, since this study focuses on long-term projection, it assumes 
that the exchange rate is allowed to adjust in the direction that clears the foreign exchange 
market. The model is closed with income balance conditions for household and government. The 
income balance of household is just the constraint of (1), and the government's income balance 
condition can be written as:3 
݌ݓ ∙ ݅݀ݐ ൅ ݌ݓ ∙ ݀ݐ ൅ ݌݂ݔ ∙ ݂ݐݎ݃ ൌ ∑ ݌ܽ௜ ∙ ݃௜௜ ൅ ݌ݓ ∙ ݃ݐݎ݄ ൅ ݌݂ݔ ∙ ݃ݐݎ݂ ൅ ݌݅݊ݒ ∙ ݏ݃  (11) 
where the left side represents the government revenue where ݅݀ݐ, ݀ݐ, and ݂ݐݎ݃ are the total 
indirect tax, direct tax, and foreign transfer to the government, respectively, and the right side is 
the government expenditure where ݃௜, ݃ݐݎ݄, ݃ݐݎ݂, and ݏ݃ are government consumption, transfer 
                                                            
3 The model treats government as a passive entity which simply collects taxes and receives transfers from abroad to 
finance its consumption, transfers to household or abroad, and savings. 
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to household, transfer to abroad, and government savings, respectively. Finally, ݌ݓ, the Hicksian 
welfare index, is chosen to be the numeraire of the model.4  
3.2 Dynamic Settings 
     The nature of recursive dynamics implies that investment is savings driven. In particular, 
savings provide the funds for investment, and investment compensates the depreciated capital 
and forms new capital stock that increases future production capacity of profitable sectors. To 
account for the observed hysteresis of structural change, the model considers both malleable 
capital, which can freely move among sectors within a given period, and sector-specific 
nonmalleable capital. The capital formation of malleable capital can be described as: 
ܭ௧ାଵ ൌ ܫ௧ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߜሻ ∙ ܭ௧  (12) 
where ܭ௧, ܫ௧, and ߜ are capital stock, investment, and depreciation rate, respectively. For a given 
period, malleable capital stock is allowed to move freely among sectors to equalize its rental rate. 
     While the capital formation process of nonmalleable capital shares a similar mechanism 
shown in (12), it becomes sector-specific. Further, for the nonmalleable capital, this study 
follows Dervis et al. (1982) so that investable funds from savings are allocated among sectors in 
proportion to the sectoral share of capital income, and the proportions are also adjusted in a way 
such that sectors with higher-than-average capital rental rates would get larger shares of 
investable funds. Interested readers may refer to Dervis et al. for details.5 
     In addition, labor force growth is also part of the dynamics described in equation (13), where 
݈ܾ݁݊௧ and ݈ܾ݃ݎ௧ represent labor force and labor force growth rate of period t, respectively: 
݈ܾ݁݊௧ାଵ ൌ ݈ܾ݁݊௧ ∙ ሺ1 ൅ ݈ܾ݃ݎ௧ሻ  (13) 
     Lastly, while lbgr୲ is exogenous, in the BAU scenario, the total factor productivity is 
calibrated to match the projected GDP growth. In policy scenarios, the total factor productivity 
calibrated for BAU becomes exogenous and GDP becomes endogenous.  
3.3 Strategy in Modeling Electricity Sectors 
     This study disaggregates the electricity sector into six sub-sectors, including coal-fired, gas-
fired, oil-fired, nuclear, hydro, and wind power. Because of the variability of wind, it is a non-
dispatchable source of power, and its output may not be available when needed. Thus, storage of 
power is expensive and storage capacity might be limited to hours or days. As a result, even with 
battery or other storage, wind power is often coupled with other dispatchable generation (Muljadi 
et al., 2004).  
     Within the top-down framework, existing studies such as Shelby et al. (2008) and McFarland 
et al. (2009) often combine the non-dispatchable and dispatchable generation by a CES function, 
as shown in Figure 4a. While using the CES aggregator with a low substitution elasticity can 
                                                            
4 According to the Walras’ Law, in a general equilibrium model, when ݊ െ 1 markets are in equilibrium, the ݊௧௛ 
market must be in equilibrium as well, which implies that while there are ݊ variables in the system, there are 
only ݊ െ 1 independent equations. Thus, one price must be exogenously determined, which is the numeraire. 
5 See p. 175-178 in Dervis et al. (1982). 
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capture the dependency of a non-dispatchable generation on dispatchable ones, the CES 
functional form also implies that the reciprocal dependency holds as well. That is, growth in 
demand for electricity will increase the use of wind power more or less proportionally to other 
sources, all else equal. While the growth of dispatchable generation will provide more backup 
capacity, allowing wind power to grow, there is no reason to think that the growth of 
dispatchable generation should depend on wind power.  
     This study adopts the following strategy: (1) electricity outputs from different sources are 
treated as perfect substitutes; (2) for wind power, there is a “fixed factor” that controls its 
expansion potential, and the fixed factor is proportional to dispatchable generation capacity. 
More specifically, I consider the case where wind power uses gas-fired and hydro power as 
backup capacity, as in Kuo (2003) and Mauritzen (2012); and (3) for wind power, the 
substitution elasticity between the fixed factor and other inputs (and henceforth the fixed factor 
elasticity) can determine to what extent the growth potential of wind is restricted. With these 
treatments, this study can capture the fact that non-dispatchable generation depends on 
dispatchable generation, but not vice versa. This structure is presented in Figure 4b.6 
     To incorporate natural resource constraints on hydro and wind in this study, the expansions of 
wind and hydro power are bounded by the levels of hydro and wind resource factors, 
respectively. The wind resource factor takes into account the highest wind power potential of 
Taiwan, which is around 3000 MWe (Taiwan Environmental Information Center, 2001). The 
resource factor for hydro is calibrated in a way such that the BAU projected hydro power output 
matches the planned expansion projects. These resource factors are inputs to the production 
functions, and the resource rents go to the representative consumer. 
 
 
 
                                                                              
         
 
                                       
                                     
Figure 4. Structure of modeling wind (non-dispatchable) generation. 
 
                                                            
6 In Figure 3b, the expansion of dispatchable generation will raise the level of fixed factor. Note that as an input, in 
equilibrium, the fixed factor could be in surplus, which means that the expansion of dispatchable generation will 
not be limited by the output level of non-dispatchable one.   
(a) Conventional Setting 
Aggregated electricity output 
(b) New Setting used in this research 
     Others                   Wind 
ߪ → 0 
 Others   Wind resource  
ߪ → ∞ 
Aggregated electricity output 
Coal     Gas            Oil    Nuclear     Hydro      Wind              ߪ → 0 
Coal   Gas      Oil   Nuclear   Hydro 
ߪ ∈ ሺ0,∞ሻ 
ߪ → ∞ 
 Fixed factor   Others 
ߪ௙௫ ∈ ሾ0,∞ሻ     Others         Wind resource  
ߪ → 0 
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4. DATA 
     The data needed for the analysis include: (1) the input-output and national accounting data, 
which describe the base year economy-wide production and consumption structures; (2) labor 
force growth projection; (3) the BAU real GDP growth projection; (4) the sectoral energy 
consumption and the associated CO2 emissions from combustion; (5) the substitution elasticities 
characterizing how different inputs can be replaced by others when relative prices change; (6) the 
output projection of the electricity sector, which also determines the growth potential of each 
generation technology; (7) the autonomous energy efficiency improvement (AEEI) coefficient, 
which represents the non-price driven energy efficiency improvement over time; (8) the world 
price levels for different commodities; and (9) the cost and effectiveness of CCS. 
     This study classifies the industry into four energy supply sectors and thirteen other industrial 
sectors, as presented in Table 3. In addition to disaggregating the electricity sector, sectors that 
fall into the following categories are separated out from others: (1) energy-intensive sectors such 
as transportation, iron, and chemical industries; and (2) sectors that account for higher shares of 
GDP, such as electronic and computer, and service sectors. 
 
Table 3. Industrial sectors in the model. 
 Energy supply sectors  Other industrial sectors 
1 Gas 5 Agriculture 
2 Coal 6 Food, alcohol & tobacco 
3 Petroleum 7 Textile & clothes 
4 Electricity supply 8 Paper products 
   4-1  coal-fired 9 Chemical industry 
   4-2  gas-fired 10 Plastic & rubber 
   4-3  oil-fired 11 Cement & non-metallic 
   4-4  nuclear 12 Iron 
   4-5  hydro 13 Electronic & computer 
   4-6  wind 14 Other manufacturing 
    15 Construction 
 16 Transportation 
 17 Service 
 
     The 17-sector Social Accounting Matrix (SAM), which summarizes the input-output and 
national accounting data of Taiwan, is compiled based on the input-output table published by the 
Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS, 2011), Taiwan’s chief 
statistics and accounting agency. A simplified representation for the input structure of production 
sectors is presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Input structure of industrial sectors. 
Gas Coal Petro* Electricity Materials Value-added 
Gas 27.31% 1.21% 27.05% 0.86% 17.56% 26.00% 
Coal 0.06% 10.81% 2.87% 1.96% 67.29% 17.01% 
Petroleum 0.89% 0.00% 79.34% 2.90% 4.49% 12.38% 
Electricity 17.76% 17.71% 12.51% 10.88% 8.29% 32.86% 
Agriculture 1.57% 0.52% 5.53% 0.98% 47.36% 44.05% 
Food, alcohol & tobacco 0.12% 0.01% 1.17% 1.28% 72.73% 24.69% 
Textile & clothes 0.12% 0.00% 1.83% 2.83% 75.75% 19.47% 
Paper products 0.14% 0.12% 2.56% 4.08% 71.73% 21.37% 
Chemical industry 0.32% 0.04% 13.73% 2.67% 70.72% 12.52% 
Plastic & rubber 0.12% 0.02% 1.16% 2.24% 76.01% 20.44% 
Cement & non-metallic 1.37% 2.75% 5.32% 4.48% 60.61% 25.49% 
Iron 0.32% 2.60% 0.94% 2.05% 80.52% 13.57% 
Electronic & Computer 0.11% 0.00% 0.13% 1.23% 75.14% 23.40% 
Other manufacturing 0.12% 0.05% 0.78% 1.01% 75.09% 22.95% 
Construction 0.02% 0.00% 1.14% 0.32% 69.41% 29.12% 
Transportation 0.02% 0.00% 23.46% 0.44% 44.28% 31.80% 
Service and other public utility 0.14% 0.00% 0.86% 0.99% 27.97% 70.04% 
*For petroleum sector, crude oil is excluded from the calculation of combustion emissions since it is 
not combusted. 
 
     While this study draws the labor force growth projection from the Council for Economic 
Planning and Development (CEPD, 2011), the BAU real GDP growth projection is from 
DGBAS (2012), which is 1.66% for 2012. For later years where the projection is not available, it 
is assumed that the annual real GDP growth rate will be 3.5% from 2013 to 2019, 3.0% from 
2020 to 2024, 2.5% from 2025 to 2034, 2% from 2035 to 2045, and 1.5% from 2046 onward. 
Sensitivity analyses with a higher or a lower GDP growth rate will be provided later. The 
substitution elasticities are based on Paltsev et al. (2005) and Rausch et al. (2009). The sectoral 
combustion emissions data are from the report published by the Bureau of Energy (Bureau of 
Energy, 2010), as presented in Table 5.   
Table 5. Base year sectoral combustion emissions. 
Sector  Sector mapping  kt-CO2 
Energy supply sectors   1–4 169404 
Agriculture    5    1630 
Mining, manufacturing & 
construction 
6–15   42655 
Transportation   16   36406 
Service   17    4125 
Household    5046 
Source: Bureau of Energy (2010). 
 
     The emissions data in the report, however, only disaggregate the industry into five sectors. To 
find CO2 emissions with a higher sectoral resolution, I first derive the energy consumption by 
each of the seventeen sectors, and then multiply the consumption level by the corresponding 
emissions coefficient, which is also presented in Bureau of Energy (2010). To find each sector's 
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energy consumption, for non-electricity sectors, I use each sector's energy consumption value 
presented in the SAM to decompose the aggregated energy consumption since each sector's 
energy consumption level (in thermal unit) is not available; and for the electricity sector, I draw 
the energy consumption (in thermal unit) of each generation type from the Energy Statistics Year 
Book (Bureau of Statistics, 2011c). The results are presented in Table 6. 
     I consider the case that in the BAU, the lost generation capacity due to the phase out of 
existing three nuclear power plants will be replaced by gas-fired generation, following the 
government's plan. In addition, the AEEI coefficient, which is 0.75% per year, is drawn from 
Yang et al. (1996). Further, I assume that the world crude oil price, which is exogenous to the 
model because of the small open economy assumption, will grow at the rate of 10% per period 
(i.e., every five years) based on the median projection for the future crude oil price presented by 
EIA (2010). Lastly, this study considers cases where CCS is viable on fossil-based generation. 
The engineering data of CCS are from Ansolabehere et al. (2007), which presents a cost estimate 
of US$40.36 per ton of CO2 captured and stored with a capture rate of 89%. A sensitivity 
analysis with a wider range of CCS cost will be presented later. 
Table 6. Base year sectoral combustion emissions. 
# Sector 
Output 
(million NT$) 
CO2 Emissions  
(ton) 
Sectoral CO2 
share (%) 
1 Gas 61229 3699842 1.43% 
2 Coal 39086 4245036 1.64% 
3 Petroleum  1037380 5143446 1.98% 
4 Electricity 
4-1    electricity: coal 219335 124950573 48.19% 
4-2    electricity: gas 145841 16530933 6.38% 
4-3    electricity: petro 83535 14834170 5.72% 
4-4    electricity: nuclear 44232 0 0.00% 
4-5    electricity: hydro 8874 0 0.00% 
4-6    electricity: wind 308 0 0.00% 
5 Agriculture 527207 1630000 0.63% 
6 Food, alcohol & tobacco 575770 381918 0.15% 
7 Textile & clothes 499244 467183 0.18% 
8 Paper products 187798 369578 0.14% 
9 Chemical industry 1932794 13166203 5.08% 
10 Plastic & rubber 461438 344273 0.13% 
11 Cement & non-metallic 262505 5188649 2.00% 
12 Iron 1179257 19090665 7.36% 
13 Electronic & Computer 4107442 524596 0.20% 
14 Other manufacturing 3253568 2377750 0.92% 
15 Construction 1382727 744185 0.29% 
16 Transportation 820902 36406000 14.04% 
17 Service and other public utility 11717928 4125000 1.59% 
 Household 5046000 1.95% 
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5. POLICY IMPACTS  
     The scenarios considered include both policy and technology dimensions. In addition to BAU, 
various combinations of non-nuclear policy, low-carbon target, and the viability of CCS on 
fossil-based generation are presented below. 
5.1 Scenarios 
     In the BAU scenario, there are no policy interventions, and the existing three nuclear power 
plants of Taiwan will phase out in 2018, 2021, and 2024, respectively, when they reach the end 
of their designed life spans. Since the model runs in five-year intervals from 2010 onward, this 
scenario is represented by assuming the No. 1 nuclear power plant, with the capacity of 1272 
MWe, will phase out in 2020, the No. 2 and No. 3 nuclear power plants, with the capacities of 
1970 MWe and 1902 MWe, respectively, will both phase out in 2025. Lastly, the Longmen 
nuclear power station, with the capacity of 2750MWe, is assumed to join the grid in 2015. 
     In the non-nuclear policy scenario, everything is the same as the BAU scenario except that the 
Longmen Nuclear Power Station will never operate.  In the low-carbon policy scenario, the 
Longmen Nuclear Power Station will be in service from 2015 onward. The government will 
achieve its CO2 reduction target, which aims at cutting the emissions to half of the 2000 levels by 
2050 (see Section II for details), by levying a hypothetical carbon tax on all sources of domestic 
combustion emissions. In the non-nuclear and low-carbon policies scenario, both the non-nuclear 
and low-carbon targets will be implemented.  
     Two additional scenarios with different technology and policy assumptions are considered: 
non-nuclear and low-carbon policies with CCS, and low-carbon with CCS and tripled-nuclear 
capacity. The latter allows tripling the nuclear power capacity by 2050 relative to the BAU level 
of 2015, while the existing four nuclear power stations of Taiwan are in service, when the low-
carbon target is pursued. While both scenarios represent optimistic projections of CO2 mitigation 
opportunity created by cutting fossil-based emissions, the later scenario presents a counterfactual 
case to show the potential role of nuclear power if the low-carbon target is the policy priority. 
5.2 Business-As-Usual Projection 
     As shown in Figure 5a, the projected CO2 emissions of BAU would increase by almost 
96.9% in 2050 compared to 2010 levels, which is lower than the projected GDP growth during 
the same period due to the improvement of AEEI and the expansion of more energy efficient 
sectors as world fuel prices continue to increase in the long run. Nevertheless, under the BAU 
scenario, although CO2 emissions intensity (CO2 emissions per dollar GDP) decreases, CO2 
emissions per capita will increase up to almost three-fold from 12.4 ton/person-year to 26.7 
ton/person-year, as shown in Figure 5b. Figure 5a also shows that the 2050 CO2 target of 50% 
below 2000 levels requires a 80.7% cut from the BAU level, reducing emissions to around 5.2 
tons per capita per year. 
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Figure 5. Projections for Taiwan’s total and per capita CO2 emissions. 
 
5.3 GDP Impact 
     Figure 6 presents the changes in real GDP relative to the BAU level. It shows that the 
negative impact on real GDP under the non-nuclear policy scenario is relatively small. This 
could be explained by the fact that the BAU scenario takes into account the government’s plan, 
which will only operate the Longmen Nuclear Power Station once ready without adding any 
additional nuclear capacity in later years. Under this benchmark, with the non-nuclear scenario, 
the reduced nuclear capacity only comes from excluding the Longmen Nuclear Power Station 
from joining the grid, and this explains why the GDP impact is mild if the non-nuclear policy 
were carried out alone. For other countries where the BAU nuclear power projects are 
unrestricted, enforcing non-nuclear policies may have a greater negative impact on their GDPs. 
     Implementation of the low-carbon policy would have a more significant impact on Taiwan’s 
economy, and if CCS is not feasible, with both non-nuclear and low-carbon policies, the real 
GDP will decrease by around 16.9% relative to the BAU projected GDP level in 2050. 
Alternatively, under the same scenario, the implementation of CCS on fossil-based generation, 
when viable, has the potential of lowering the negative GDP impact down to about 7.6% by 
reducing the carbon penalty of fossil-based generation when the shadow carbon price exceeds 
the cost of CCS. Lastly, the negative GDP impact under the low-carbon target could be lowered 
to around 4.7% if the capacity of nuclear power were tripled, as shown in the result for the low-
carbon with CCS and tripled-nuclear capacity scenario. 
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Figure 6. GDP levels and impacts under different scenarios. 
 
5.4 Additional CO2 Emissions of Non-nuclear Scenario 
     Under the non-nuclear policy scenario, fossil-based generation will replace part of the lost 
electricity output, and this will lead to an increase in Taiwan’s total CO2 emissions, as shown in 
Figure 7a. While electricity sectors, especially coal-fired power, will contribute to most of the 
additional emissions, a slight increase in emissions from other industrial sectors reflects that 
electricity input is substituted by other fossil-based energy input. Figure 7b shows that Taiwan’s 
total CO2 emissions may increase by more than 3.5% relative to BAU levels from 2035 onwards. 
The emissions increase is not trivial, which suggests that when pursuing the non-nuclear policy, 
it is also important to consider effective measures that could curb CO2 emissions. 
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Figure 7. Increase in CO2 emissions relative to BAU levels under the non-nuclear scenario. 
 
5.5 Carbon Price 
     Figure 8 shows that under the low-carbon policy scenario, the carbon price will increase from 
16 US$/ton-CO2 in 2015 to 230 US$/ton-CO2 in 2030, and will finally exceed 2100 US$/ton-
CO2 in 2050 if CCS on fossil-based generation is not available. The carbon price under the 
scenario of non-nuclear and low-carbon policies will be even higher since there will be more 
emissions from fossil-based generation, which bid up the carbon price. This study also finds that 
if CCS were viable (at the cost of US$ 40.36 per ton of CO2 captured and stored and with a 89% 
reduction rate), it could significantly reduce the carbon price. Nevertheless, even with CCS, the 
carbon price may still exceed 1300 US$/ton-CO2 in 2050. While expanding nuclear capacity 
beyond the Longman nuclear project to replace fossil-based generation is unlikely in Taiwan due 
to safety and waste disposal concerns, Figure 8 also shows that tripling the nuclear power 
capacity on top of the CCS option could further reduce the carbon price down to around 789 
US$/ton-CO2 in 2050. In short, if expanding nuclear power capacity is not an option, then carbon 
abatement cost would be much higher. 
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Figure 8. Carbon prices under different scenarios. 
 
5.6 Sectoral Impact 
     Compared to the non-nuclear policy, enforcement of carbon policy has a much larger sectoral 
impact (change in sectoral output), as shown in Figure 9. Note that with the small-open 
economy assumption, the fact that Taiwan has to import almost all of its energy supply suggests 
that it has to bear most of the burden from the implementation of the hypothetical carbon tax 
since energy supply from the rest of the world is highly elastic. In particular, sectors that would 
incur higher negative impacts are those: (1) that provide fossil-based products including coal, 
petroleum, and gas; and (2) that depend more on high-carbon content inputs (and thus have 
higher levels of combustion emissions per unit of output) such as the chemical industry, iron 
industry, cement and non-metallic industry, coal-fired generation, etc., as shown in Table 4.7 
Although adopting CCS on fossil-based generation allows a higher level of electricity output 
compared to no CCS cases, it does not negate the effects of enforcement of carbon policy.  
Changes in relative prices that favor the expansion of less energy-intensive sectors will, over the 
long run, cause more production factors to move to sectors that incur fewer carbon penalties.  
Such sectors would avoid carbon penalties directly (through combustions emissions) or 
indirectly (through the use of electricity) such as service sectors and electronic and computer 
industry. Lastly, Figure 9 shows that with the low-carbon target, the sectoral impacts could be 
further reduced when the nuclear power capacity is allowed to triple by 2050, which provides 
more carbon-free electricity output. 
 
                                                            
7 See Subsection 5.8 and Figure 9 for the case of the negative impact on coal-fired generation. 
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Figure 9. Change in sectoral output under different scenarios. 
 
5.7 Changes in Net Exports and the Implication for Carbon Leakage 
     Figure 10 presents the changes in sectoral net exports. For simplicity, only the results for the 
scenario of non-nuclear and low-carbon policies are presented since the impacts under this 
scenario are most significant. Note that the model has taken into account the case where outputs 
from electricity, construction, transportation, and service sectors are non-tradable. An interesting 
finding is that the net exports of sectors with larger carbon footprints will decrease significantly 
compared to those of other sectors, due to the increase in imports and/or the decrease in exports. 
Prominent examples are cases for the chemical industry, cement and non-metallic industry, and 
iron industry, which together accounted for almost 15% of Taiwan’s total CO2 emissions in 2006 
(see Table 6). While this suggests that CO2 emissions abatement in Taiwan results in carbon 
leakage, if the rest of the world also imposes carbon reduction policies, one could expect that the 
cost for Taiwan to pursue a non-nuclear and low-carbon world will be higher since the imports of 
carbon-intensive products will become more expensive as well.   
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Figure 10. Changes in net exports. 
 
5.8 Electricity Sector and Sensitivity Analyses 
     This study finds that, if the non-nuclear policy were enforced alone, wind power will provide 
a tiny fraction of the electricity supply—around 0.48% in 2050 compared to the BAU level of 
0.44%, as shown in Figure 11. In fact, fossil-based generation will play the main role in 
compensating part of the lost capacity of Longmen Nuclear Power Station since the expansion of 
hydro power is more restricted due to the resource constraint.  
     With the carbon policy, if CCS is not available, coal-fired power has to be completely phase-
out 20 years from now, and other generation options, especially gas-fired power, will provide 
around three quarters of electricity supply. As shown in Figure 11, when both policies were 
adopted, gas-fired power will account for almost 89.7% of electricity supply in 2050, and the rest 
will be supplied by hydro power (7.0%) and wind power (3.3%).  
     Figure 11 also shows that with the carbon constraint, while gas-fired power will continue to 
provide the highest output level among other generation when CCS is viable, there will be 
significant roles left for coal-fired and oil-fired power in later years after the introduction of CCS 
between 2020 and 2025, when the carbon price per ton exceeds US$40 and makes CCS 
economically feasible. Although under the carbon policy, the higher level of total electricity 
supply when CCS is viable also suggests a lower negative impact on GDP, the electricity supply 
may still decrease by around 45% compared to the BAU level. Finally, if tripling the nuclear 
power capacity by 2050 (compared to the 2015 level) is viable, nuclear power would provide 
more than 51% of electricity output in 2050, and it will replace a lot of electricity output from 
fossil-based generation with CCS (especially coal fired power with CCS), and also increase the 
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total electricity output by almost 26%, compared to the scenario when both policies are enforced. 
In short, if nuclear power will not be an option, then developing more electricity-efficient 
industries will be a crucial step toward a low-carbon future.   
 
  
 
Figure 11. Output shares of different generation types. 
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     Note that this study considers the dependency of wind power on other dispatchable 
generation, including gas-fired and hydro power. Under the aforementioned scenario with both 
policies, the wind output will be around 5590 million KWh/year in 2050. It represents the middle 
projection of more extreme cases. More specifically, as shown in Figure 12, in 2050, wind 
power output under the scenario of non-nuclear and low-carbon policies may range from 2649 
million KWh/year (1.6% of total electricity supply), where the expansion of wind power is 
completely limited by the scale of its back-up capacity,8 to 8383 million KWh/year (4.9% of 
total electricity supply), where the expansion of wind power is less or no longer dependent on the 
back-up capacity,9 and all potential wind capacity of Taiwan—3000 MWe—is exhausted.10  
     Figure 13 provides a sensitivity analysis on GDP impact with various CCS costs. It shows 
that for fossil-based generation, even under a relatively optimistic scenario with a CCS cost of 
only US$ 20 per ton of CO2 captured and stored, GDP may still decline by around 7.5% relative 
to the BAU level in 2050 if both policies were enforced—a result again confirming that a 
substantial emissions cut on other industrial sectors (without the help of CCS) is essential to 
achieve the very stringent CO2 reduction target. 
     Lastly, Figure 14 shows how the uncertainty in the BAU GDP growth rate projection may 
affect the CO2 emissions of Taiwan, and, in turn, determine the emissions reduction efforts, as 
reflected by the shadow carbon price shown in Figure 15. This study finds that the carbon price 
may still exceed US$1600/ton-CO2 in 2050 under the lower GDP growth rate scenario, if CCS is 
not viable, and both the non-nuclear and low-carbon policies were carried out. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
8 This is modeled by a zero fixed factor elasticity of wind power (ߪ௙௫ ൌ 0ሻ. See Figure 3 and Figure 12. 
9 This is modeled by ߪ௙௫ ൒ 0.3. 
10 The estimate for the average wind power capacity factor in Taiwan ranges from 0.29 to 0.37 (Kuo, 2003; Taiwan 
Panorama, 2011).  In this study, the capacity factor used is 0.32, which is the estimated break-even level for 
wind power to become economically viable (Hung, 2008).  
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Figure 12. Wind power output under different fixed factor elasticity. 
 
 
Figure 13. Change in GDP under different CCS costs (US$/ton-CO2). 
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Figure 14. BAU CO2 emissions projections under different GDP growth trajectories. 
 
 
Figure 15. Carbon prices for non-nuclear and low-carbon scenario under different 
assumptions for BAU GDP growth. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
     Before the Fukushima nuclear accident, the pressure to cut CO2 emissions brought nuclear 
power into the spotlight. After the accident, however, people in Taiwan have seriously 
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considered non-nuclear options since, much like Japan, Taiwan faces threats of devastating 
earthquakes and tsunamis.  
     In this study, I provide an economy-wide analysis for Taiwan under the low-carbon growth 
path with or without the nuclear option, and improve the modeling for the dependency of non-
dispatchable generation (wind power in particular) on other dispatchable generation. Pursuing a 
low-carbon world without the nuclear option requires a huge change in industrial structure and a 
significant decrease in GDP growth, as carbon-intensive activities will be discouraged. Under 
this scenario, the electricity supply will also decrease significantly relative to the BAU level—an 
outcome reflecting that, in Taiwan, expansions of renewable generation such as hydro and wind 
are limited by resources and technological constraints. If the nuclear option is on the table, the 
negative impact on the economy is reduced, but this would require the assurance that nuclear 
power could avoid disasters such as the one at Fukushima, and that disposal of nuclear wastes is 
no longer an issue. Lastly, the analysis models Taiwan as a small open economy. One result of 
this is that we see large effects on trade. While this study does not explicitly model the rest of the 
world, the likely implication is carbon leakage. If the rest of the world were also to pursue low-
carbon policies, there would be fewer channels for Taiwan to reduce its CO2 mitigation costs 
through trade.   
     While for Taiwan, carrying out the low-carbon target without the nuclear option could be 
expensive, the costs may be lowered through opportunities such as purchasing cheaper emissions 
allowances from abroad whenever possible, which could be an extension for future research. 
Another extension is to come up with a better representation for the production structure of 
industrial sectors since the one used in this research may not fully represent the technical 
opportunity for substituting away from fossil fuels that incur higher carbon penalties. Finally, 
future research could also consider the potential roles of technical innovations. For instance, 
recent research funded by the National Science Council argues that in Taiwan, geothermal power 
may have the capacity of up to 25.4 GWe—almost ten times that of Longmen Nuclear Power 
Station (Radio Taiwan International, 2011). Technology innovations, once viable, may 
significantly lower the cost of pursuing the non-nuclear and low-carbon policies. 
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